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The purpose of integrated hazard analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, failure modes 
and effects analyses, fault trees and many other similar tools is to give managers of a 
program some idea of the risks associated with their program.  All risk tools establish a set 
of undesired events and then try to evaluate the risk to the program by assessing the severity 
of the undesired event and the likelihood of that event occurring.  Some tools provide 
qualitative results, some provide quantitative results and some do both.   However, in the 
end the program manager and his/her team must decide which risks are acceptable and 
which are not.   Even with a wide array of analysis tools available, risk acceptance is often a 
controversial and difficult decision making process.  And yet, today’s space exploration 
programs are moving toward more “risk based design” approaches.  Thus, risk 
identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering 
development process.  This paper explores how known and unknown information influences 
risk-based decisions by looking at how the various parts of our personalities are affected by 
what they know and what they don’t know.  This paper then offers some criteria for 
consideration when making risk-based decisions. 
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CAIB        =    Columbia Accident Investigation Board  
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CG            =    Center of Gravity  
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NASA        =    National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
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I. Executive Summary  
 
The recent experience of working with risk informed decision making (RIDM) used on the NASA Constellation 
Program (CxP) presented a unique opportunity to study how the risk informed design process arrives at a decision 
and what influences that decision.  Further study of RIDM took the authors on an unexpected path that led to the 
very heart of how human beings make any decision.  Specifically, humans have an amazing inherent capacity to 
interpolate, that is, to fill in missing parts of a picture to make sense of their world and to make decisions. That 
capacity comes in many “flavors” which arise from our personalities.  In the context of risks, it is a common belief 
that if we “understand” our risks then we will make good decisions based on that understanding.  However, as the 
authors investigated how humans “gain understanding of risk,” we found that there is a component to risk-based 
decision making that is known in the scientific community but is not fully explored and leveraged in current real 
world techniques for technical risk-based decision making. That component is associated with the unknown 
unknowns. When some prior NASA accidents were briefly revisited, it was found that the unknown unknowns likely 
influenced the decisions that resulted in the accidents. Furthermore, when this component was combined with the 
science that drives our inherent human decision making processes, the unknown unknowns seems to be a significant 
player in the decisions we make about most anything.  Recognizing this, the authors looked at how the unknown 
unknowns could be used to lower cost of NASA programs. It was found that by acknowledging the existence of 
unknown unknowns and allowing the existence to influence early risk-based decisions, some program decisions 
would change while most would most likely not change. The authors found that this approach, where it would result 
in different decisions, could result in significant savings in program total costs.   
 
To really know everything there is to know about a risk, or anything else, one must understand three things: 1) what 
they know about a risk, 2) what they know they don’t know about a risk and, 3) what they don’t know they don’t 
know about a risk
1
.  Risk analysis tools are developed as a means of communication to inform program management 
of the risks that have been identified and serve as management tools to assure risks are assessed, mitigated and 
resolved where appropriate.  Risk analysis tools like probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), hazard analysis, fault tree 
analysis (FTA), software safety analyses (SSA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEAs), etc each provide 
alternative perspectives to characterizing/classifying risks based on severity and likelihood.  However, in the early 
stages of a program all of these tools are challenged when attempting to come up with accurate estimates of 
likelihood.  These tools serve very useful roles in risk assessment but cannot completely capture the risk picture 
because they all are based on assumptions (both explicit and implicit). However, analyses are still vulnerable to 
likelihood assessment errors due to the fact that whatever an assessor doesn’t know cannot be included in the model. 
Margins can and often are added to analyses to accommodate these unknown unknowns, but some programs cannot 
tolerate the impacts of carrying large margins (eg:  mass, center-of-gravity (CG) , cost, etc) and so try to limit what 
they can accommodate in the design to what they know they have to mitigate leaving the unknown unknowns to 
reveal themselves in due time.   
 
This paper investigates (1) how risk-related decision making is influenced by how the decision-maker responds to 
the unknown unknown contributors to the risk, and (2) whether the decider’s aggregate personality influences their 
response. We find that this aggregate personality is influenced by a combination of cognitive, affective, volitional, 
conscious, sub-conscious, unconscious and environmental factors. Because it is an integral part of how we relate to 
the world, people who make risk-based decisions are usually unaware of this influence. And because these forces are 
normally sub-conscious, the influences of the unknown unknowns are manifest in accidents to an unknown but real 
extent.  This means that at least some of the decisions that contribute to an accident are influenced by the human 
struggle to deal or not deal (consciously or sub-consciously) with the unknowns.  It is important to note that this is 
not a failure of engineering or management.  It is the inherent consequence of making risk-based decisions with 
incomplete data and uncertain knowledge.  Since it does not seem realistic that one can know everything there is to 
know about anything, there will always be gaps in our data. The purpose of this paper is not to judge the events that 
led to prior accidents.  Instead, this paper suggests that becoming aware of potential sources of unknowns can be 
used to help managers strategically make risk-based decisions that can benefit their overall programs.  A 
methodology for design implementation of safety requirements is proposed that addresses this issue and is believed 
to provide a more robust design that is subject to less rework later in a program, thus reducing overall program cost. 
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II. Background 
A. Risk Tolerance 
 
1. Public Perceptions 
 
Risk is perceived at all levels of conscious thinking and so is influenced at all levels of thinking.  The general 
population can have its own view of risk that is not necessarily the result of some combination of how any one, 
group or even the entire group of members of the population views the risk.    For example:  the population of 
Houston recently voted to disallow the use of cameras to fine drivers who run through red lights at intersections.  
However, the city managers decided that the cameras must remain operational until they get an agreement to 
terminate them from the contractor who operates them.  The reason the cameras are there in the first place is to 
mitigate red light runners, without using police officers.  The public clearly supports the use of police officers to 
mitigate red light runners, but not automated machines.  The city managers and the voters both represent the 
population but there are two different answers to how on to deal with the risk associated with red light runners.   In 
fact, the group with control on how to deal with the red light runners is making a decision based on an influence that 
has nothing to do with the red light runners themselves.    The voters perceive the risk one way and the city 
managers view the risk another.  Each group is influenced by different outside forces (which include other related 
risks) and are arriving at different conclusions. This dichotomy offers an immediate clue into the nature of risk-
related decisions: they are affected by many internal and external influences.  Our perception of any given risk at 
any moment in time can be affected by many influences.    
 
2. Levels of Acceptable Risk 
 
Another important point about risk is that the same or similar risk in a different situation or context can result in a 
completely different decision on the acceptability of a risk.   This is particularly evident in the public’s multi-level 
perception of NASA risks.  On one level, NASA failures that result in loss of crew (LOC) are not considered 
acceptable risks.  However, when compared relative to the gains of humanity’s desire to explore, some of NASA’s 
failures are considered acceptable as a means of ensuring future progress
14
. This perspective may seem 
counterintuitive, but the desire to know sometimes overpowers the risks of the endeavor. NASA astronauts 
knowingly and deliberately strap themselves into a vehicle whose operation is considered very hazardous, and yet a 
social standard has been set that “failure is not an option.” Accidents resulting in LOC in this situation are not 
considered acceptable losses.    
 
Contrast this situation with oil company workers who work on or around oil, gasoline, and diesel fuel tanks at a 
refinery.   These employees also deliberately and knowingly go out and put themselves in very hazardous situations 
every day.  However, the public perception of this risk is quite different from the NASA astronaut.   NASA needs 
enormous amounts of justification for their crews to take risk because NASA, from a acceptable risk perspective, is 
held to a higher standard
14
.  The refineries also need some justifications but do not receive near the public scrutiny 
nor the exposure that NASA does even in the event of an accident.  In fact, refinery accidents that result in employee 
loss occur much more frequently than NASA incidents that result in LOC.   Actually, the public cares about every 
employee but because the employee takes that risk many times without incident there is a great deal more tolerance. 
Thus, the acceptance of risk also varies greatly with the perception of a risk and even the same risk in different 
context can yield different acceptability answers.  
B. Risk Assessment 
 
There are many risk assessment tools for managers or designers to utilize, each with a unique set of features, 
benefits and limitations.  But when it comes to risk-based decision making, there is a very limited set of dimensions 
that humans draw upon when making decisions.  These dimensions are: 1) what we know about a system or 
circumstance (known knowns), 2) what we know we don’t know about a system or circumstance (known unknowns) 
and 3) what we don’t know we don’t know (unknown unknowns). 
 
Identification 
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Every person, group or population must first perceive a risk in order to evaluate and make a decision on whether to 
accept, mitigate or avoid it.  Hazard analysis is a tool which provides a framework for managers of any task or 
endeavor to systematically identify and mitigate the risks associated with a design or operational plan.  The hazard 
analysis approach starts with a checklist based on energy sources, operational influences, interfaces and physical 
properties of any design in order to bring out possible safety risks to the public, to ground or flight crews or to the 
mission inherent in a design.  Once hazards and their causes are identified, the hazard analyst works with the 
designers to refine the details of an identified safety risk in order to outline features which will mitigate the risk. 
Hazard analysis is one of a number of engineering based approaches used to identify safety-related risks. It is 
generally the most prevalent risk identification process because it is the most basic.  
 
Mitigation 
 
Once identified, some risks require mitigation.  Mitigation, from this perspective, is a means of preventing or 
hindering hazards or threats from manifesting themselves in a design, configuration or operation. Stated differently, 
mitigations are features put into the system that help the people involved avoid the realization of the undesired risk 
consequences. Mitigations must have three components: 1) they must be real and present when needed, 2) they must 
be verifiable as a means of mitigating the perceived risk, and 3) they must be capable of operating in whatever 
environment or operational circumstance they are required. Just as there are varying levels of acceptable risks, there 
are also varying levels of mitigations.    
 
Residual Risk 
 
Once the risk is mitigated to an acceptable level in any design or operational scenario, some will see the risk as no-
longer credible or applicable to their own design. There is a yet a credible risk that the mitigations provided for the 
hazard identified will not be available when needed or may fail due to unforeseen circumstances (unknown states, 
interactions, influences or environments).  The likelihood of the risk occurring despite the use of the mitigations is 
the residual risk of the design after the controls have been implemented. Risk-based decisions are based on the 
perception of the residual risks once mitigations are implemented. This perception space is where most difficulties 
are encountered.  As noted earlier, with various risk-based influences at work, the perception of any specific risk can 
vary dramatically across decision-makers.  It’s important to understand why.   
C. Understanding Residual Risk 
 
We assert that perception of residual risk is the real driver that any person will use to make a risk based decision and 
it’s based on the three dimensions of risk:  1) what we know about a system or circumstance, 2) what we know we 
don’t know about a system or circumstance, and 3) what we don’t know we don’t know about a system or 
circumstance.  In other words, residual risk is simply the risk after employing a set of mitigations. 
 
1. What we know about a system (known knowns) 
 
Our perception of risk is shaped in part by what we know about a system/circumstance.  Known risks (hazards) in 
the system are mitigated where appropriate.  These risks are understood and mitigated to the point that the 
probability of realizing the risk consequence is at an acceptable level.   For instance, NASA has significant 
knowledge on the strengths of materials (metals or composites) used to carry structural loads in a spacecraft design. 
Engineers spend many man-hours characterizing the loads that the materials will have to carry and then designing 
the integrated system to carry those loads plus some margin of safety.   They optimize their designs to cover all 
potential loads cases and still maintain sufficient margins of safety to ensure the risk cannot be realized during the 
mission profile.  Their process and results are based on more than 50 years of experience. Hence, once all of the load 
cases are identified, the risk of structural failure is believed to be controlled without further mitigations.   Engineers 
have learned that they can count on their designs to perform as expected because it has been demonstrated often.  
Therefore, what is known about the structural design of a spacecraft is believed to be very high.  This can lead some 
risk evaluators to conclude that they know everything about the system under consideration and to feel confident in 
their decisions that the risk is sufficiently mitigated or no longer credible.     
 
2. What we know we don’t know about a system (known unknowns) 
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Consider the driver who is trying to pull out of their neighborhood into an intersection that is near the apex of a 
curve. The driver is faced with what they know and don’t know about the situation and must make a risk based 
decision on when to proceed into the intersection.   The driver knows that they cannot see far enough around the 
curve to see a vehicle that may be coming at a higher than expected speed in time to avoid a collision.    Here the 
driver often uses what they do know to limit (or place a boundary on) what they don’t know so that they can arrive 
at a decision that will result in a safe crossing. For instance, if the driver is very familiar with the intersection, then 
they may know that the traffic signals for oncoming traffic are timed such that there is a big break in the traffic 
where they can safely proceed. The driver may also know from previous experience that a rapid acceleration will 
shorten the time they are exposed to a potential collision.  The driver may even be experienced as to estimate the 
number of seconds it takes when a car first appears around the curve until the car arrives into the intersection.  All 
these factors and many others like weather, road conditions, road construction, emergency vehicle traffic etc can be 
used as filters to determine a safe time to enter the intersection.  The driver may realize they may not know exactly 
what is coming around the bend next but they may feel confident that they have bounded what they don’t know and 
this allows them to proceed when all the criteria is met.   Once a person feels they understand the risks of a situation 
they will often accept that risk based on what they know and what they know they don’t know. 
 
3. What we don’t know we don’t know about a system (unknown unknowns) 
 
However, there is still a third dimension that affects risk outcomes - what we don’t know we don’t know (the 
unknown unknowns).  For instance, in the case of the strength of materials of the Columbia wing leading edge, 
margins of safety were calculated based on expected environments and known load cases that were thought to cover 
the worst load cases that the spacecraft would ever see.  Load cases, however, arose unexpectedly, in flight, that 
were outside the capabilities of the models used to derive the margins of safety.  Findings per the CAIB report
2
: 
 
F3.8-1 The impact test program demonstrated that foam can cause a wide range of impact 
damage, from cracks to a 16- by 17-inch hole. 
 
F3.8-2  The wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon composite material and associated 
support hardware are remarkably tough and have impact capabilities that far exceed the 
minimal impact resistance specified in their original design requirements. Nevertheless, these 
tests demonstrate that this inherent toughness can be exceeded by impacts representative of 
those that occurred during Columbia’s ascent. 
 
F3.8-6   NASA’s current tools, including the Crater model, are inadequate to evaluate Orbiter 
Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts during pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-
launch activity” ‡   
 
There are many complex reasons for the decisions that resulted in the Columbia Accident and it is not within the 
scope of this paper to evaluate them. However, the decision making portion that involved the amount of knowledge 
the experts thought they knew about the system illustrates that some portion of risk-based decision making is made 
based on how much we think we know about a system.   In fact, per F3.8-2 above, the CAIB testing revealed that the 
structure of the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels and wing leading edge was even stronger than experts 
believed.  Thus, because of the beliefs in the strength of the structure and the worst case loads expected from a foam 
debris impact, it was not originally deemed credible that a hole would be found in the wing leading edge.  It turned 
out that the foam debris environment imparted a much bigger impact load than was initially believed. In other 
words, the circumstance that they “didn’t know what they didn’t know” about foam transport outside of the models 
ability to characterize presented a greater risk than was originally assessed. 
 
Similarly, considering the Apollo 1 fire accident and its subsequent investigation, one can also quickly see the 
unexpected outcome was due to what engineers “didn’t know that they didn’t know.”  From the Apollo 1 fire US 
Senate Investigation
3
:   
 
“Senator SMITH.  What I am trying to get is, where the error was, where we slipped up in not 
having or taking every precaution before we had that test. I do not see why we would not have 
precautions in testing before flight. 
                                                           
‡
 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Section 3 Findings  
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Dr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess it is a matter of judgment that was made relative to that flight. 
Maybe I had better ask Colone1 Borman.  He was going to fly in a Block I spacecraft and he 
was prepared to go although knowing right much about this. I think we had better let him 
comment on that. 
Colonel BORMAN. Yes. I think, Senator, we were very aware of the problem of fire in flight 
and we had adopted procedures primarily of venting the command module to a vacuum to 
eliminate the fire.  We had done an extensive study on this before our Gemini 7 flight.  
However, I think that none of us were fully aware of the hazard that existed when you combine 
a pure oxygen atmosphere with ignition, and so this test, as I mentioned briefly during the 
findings and determinations, was not classified as hazardous. I do not believe that anyone 
within the test organization or the program office considered it hazardous. And, this is the 
unfortunate trap through which we fell.”§  
 
 
Here it is also clear that the perception of the risk and the actual risk were not aligned despite the fact that the 
managers and engineers involved believed they understood the risk.  They “didn’t know what they didn’t know” 
about pure O2 in the test model, so their perception of what they didn’t know was that the risks were acceptable. 
They later learned that their assessment of the risk was not complete. 
 
Per NASA’s Risk Informed Decision Making Handbook, NASA/SP-2010-576
4
: 
 
“Risk: In the context of RIDM, risk is the potential for shortfalls, which may be realized 
in the future, with respect to achieving explicitly-stated performance commitments. The 
performance shortfalls may be related to institutional support for mission execution, or 
related to any one or more of the following mission execution domains: safety, technical, 
cost, schedule. 
 
Risk is operationally defined as a set of triplets: 
a. The scenario(s) leading to degraded performance in one or more performance 
measures, 
b. The likelihood(s) of those scenarios, 
c. The consequence(s), impact, or severity of the impact on performance that would 
result if those scenarios were to occur. 
Uncertainties are included in the evaluation of likelihoods and consequences” 
 
In other words, NASA defines a risk as the potential to get an undesired outcome from a design or circumstance and 
is measured by the severity and likelihood of the undesired outcome.   Thus, when making a risk-based decision one 
of the key parameters is the likelihood of the outcome.   Estimating the likelihood of the outcome is ultimately 
influenced by perceptions because what we know about the design or circumstance gives us a very solid basis for 
believing we can predict the outcome, but what we know we don’t know and what we don’t know we don’t know 
introduce uncertainties in that prediction.   
 
For example:  (also from the Senate Investigation of the Apollo 1 Fire) we see that the decision on the acceptability 
of the risk for entering the spacecraft was dependent on how much they thought they knew:  
 
Senator Percy. Colonel Borman, you mentioned before that you would not have hesitated on 
this fateful day to enter the spacecraft yourself knowing what you did at that time. 
I now ask the obvious question. Knowing what you know now, would you have refused to enter 
the spacecraft on that day? 
 
Colone1 BORMAN. Yes, sir 
 
More accurately their original decision to accept the risk of entering the spacecraft for the “plugs out” test was really 
impacted by what they didn’t know they didn’t know. There is a subtle but important distinction here.  We use tools, 
logic, and most of all experience to help us understand a risk.  But saying we “understand a risk” implies we know 
everything we need to know about that risk.  People can only reach a point at which they perceive or estimate they 
                                                           
§
 Excerpt from Dr Floyd Thompson & Colonel Frank Borman Testimony to US Senate committee Investigating Apollo 1 Fire3 
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know enough to make a decision.  The subtle difference here is that when we reach that point where we think we can 
make a decision, it is because we believe we know enough, and this point is different from when we actually know 
enough.   
 
In fact, since we cannot know everything there is to know about many risks, it is very difficult to ascertain that we 
actually know enough.  In order to cope, our minds actually interpolate or “fill in the blanks” according to our 
personalities and experience.  We, in fact, unconsciously make assumptions to make our world manageable.  
Engineering handles the unknown by applying margins to the design or circumstance as a way of “filling in the 
blanks”, but how much margin is adequate is often debated because even when one adds margin they cannot know 
what they do not know and so may not know that the margin covered a relevant unknown case.  So is it then 
appropriate to add infinite margin? Certainly not! Fortunately, we do know that when margin becomes excessive 
you stop being able to perform the primary function. However, it could be valuable to investigate how we approach 
the unknown unknowns and thus reveal if there are additional ways to manage these unknowns. 
 
Characterizing what we don’t know we don’t know varies greatly among people.  A person’s environment, 
personality, social interactions and even their own belief system can influence how this third dimension is perceived.   
Because so many influences affect how this dimension is perceived, there is significant variation in acceptability of 
a given risk. Actually, the influence of the unknown unknowns is so profound that even when trying to define 
boundaries for what risks should be considered, an evaluator is presented with terms such as “credible”.  The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “credible” as “offering reasonable grounds for being believed
5
.”   With 
subjective terms like “credible”, “uncertainty”, and “believed” as the operating parameters for risk evaluation it 
becomes easy to see that it’s what we don’t know that shapes our ultimate risk-based decisions.  Even the basis of 
the risk evaluation come from what we “believe to be the case”, not from what we know.  Stated another way, if you 
knew everything about a risk the outcome would be 100% certain. Hence, there would be no risk at all because risk 
arises from uncertainty and uncertainty arises from what we don’t know, not what we know. For an extreme 
example of this consider that an astronaut while in a space suit can chose at anytime to “accept the risk” and remove 
the helmet from their spacesuit while in a space vacuum environment.   This is not a real risk because the outcome is 
100% certain for that action.  It’s the uncertainty in the cases where the astronauts helmet could be inadvertently 
removed that give rise to a risk to the crewmember from a hazard analysis perspective. Here again the crewman may 
“accept the risk” and go into the space environment knowing that there is some small chance their helmet could be 
inadvertently dislodged.  It’s the uncertainty that drives the risk and subsequent decision not the certainty of the well 
understood cases.  Knowledge removes uncertainty, how much of that uncertainty is removed is subject to 
interpretation by the individual and their interpretation is influenced by their perceptions of the uncertainties.   Thus, 
it becomes important to understand how those perceptions are shaped and influenced so that better risk-based 
decisions can be made. 
D. The Role of Verification 
 
The hazard analysis process relies extensively on the philosophy of “trust but verify”.   The hazard analysis process 
is an iterative process that operates concurrently with engineering development cycles to identify, evaluate and 
mitigate safety risks in a timely and cost effective manner (see Figure 1).   In order for the hazard analysis to close a 
hazard (aka safety risk), it must have evidence of the existence and effectiveness of the design features (hazard 
controls) that are being utilized to mitigate the hazard.  Verification in effect increases what is known about a design 
or circumstance so that some level of confidence may be gained that the hazard mitigations will work when needed.  
 
Verifications take the form of analyses, tests, demonstrations or inspections.  Any of these can be used in any 
combination in order to establish the presence and effectiveness of the hazard controls.  Verification in the field of 
space systems engineering covers two important processes: qualification and acceptance.  These processes establish 
two things. First, they “establish what we really do know about a system.” Second, they “bound what we don’t really 
know about a system.” Establishment of what we do know about a system is fairly easy to understand as long as the 
developer had the forethought to identify the constraints under which the hazard control design is valid.  Bounding 
what we know we don’t know about a system can also be achieved with the proper verification approach.   For 
example: in the prior case of the driver attempting to enter an intersection, the driver would had to have experienced 
the traffic light further beyond the curve to be sure it was there and working in a way that will give them a safe 
break in the traffic. Periodic reinforcement is essential to giving users confidence in hazard controls.  So periodically 
that driver would have to pass near or through that traffic light to verify it’s still working effectively to mitigate the  
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Figure 1. Overview of Constellation Phased Safety Review Process
 
potential for a collision. The knowledge of the traffic response to the traffic light gives the driver some capabili
limit what they don’t know before proceeding into the intersection. Thus, verification removes some unknowns and 
establishes confidence in our perceptions of a risk.  However, unknown unknowns still exist and even the size of the 
set of unknown unknowns is not known.  In the worst case the set of unknowns is infinite
III. Risk
A. Personality Influences  
 
Review of Literature 
 
Psychologists today have identified what’s called “the Big 5” personality traits
personalities: Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. 
Openness to Experience means a willingness to experience new ideas, concepts, and experiences and involve
imagination and insight. Conscientiousness means to be organized, disciplined, dedicated to goals and thoughtful of 
others and mindful of details.  Extraversion means a high degree of socialization, talkativeness, emotional 
expression and assertiveness.  Agreeableness means to have trust, altruism, affection, and kindness. 
means to worry, experience anxiety, not be emotionally stable, as well as being unhappy and irritable.
Weber found a strong correlation between risk perception and 
Scale
7
. They were able to measure the correlation between the perception of greater risk and the decreasing 
willingness to take risks. Furthermore, they assert that risk attitude is a personality trait that can
taking.  Nicholson, Fenton-O’Creevy, Soane, and Willman
personality traits of “sensation seeking” and “value openness”
neuroticism and agreeableness which reduce our concern for negative consequences
personalities with high conscientiousness tended to strive for benefit through rigorous disciplined processes where 
as personalities with low conscientiousnes
 
onautics 
 
8
. 
-Based Decision Making for Hazard Related Risks
6
 that form the basic traits of our 
risk taking via the use of a modified DOSPERT 
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 found that increased risk taking is patterned on 
 especially when combined with 
.  Moreover,
s tended toward “get rich, quick” schemes.   Hung and Tangpong also
 
Figure 2.  The Johari Window
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found that openness is an influence for risk propensity and that another factor known as ambiguity tolerance 
influences our willingness to accept risk
is influenced by our personalities.   
 
NASA, in the context of developing its managers and leaders, has utilized the 
programs for several years. The Johari Window
Ingham in 1955
10
, that was developed to show how our communications and interpersonal interactions are 
influenced by what we know and what we don’t know.  The Johari window identifies four areas that are influenced 
by knowledge and experience.  The Open/Free area represen
known by others. The Hidden area represents information we know about ourselves but keep from others. The blind 
area (blind spots) represents information about ourselves of which we are unaware, but it is
unknown area represents information that is unknown to the self and to others. When generalized for the context of 
risk, the authors believe that the Hidden
unknown unknowns) areas all represent various components of 
the mechanisms of feedback, vulnerability and courage, the self can begin to journey into these areas with the 
express purpose of shrinking them and moving their contents into the Open/Free area. 
 
A Total Risk Model 
 
The Johari window concept can be used as a basis to form a 
factors that influence a risk-based decision. One can look at the total
of a wagon wheel.  The total risk picture is known if an assessor understands the total sum of what they know, what 
they know they don’t know and what they don’t know they don’t know.  This model can
the three factors that influence our risk
the wagon wheel in accordance with how different parts of our personalities view a risk and showing what the 
wagon wheel might look like when a particular part considers a risk acceptable.  (Note: the Johari window considers 
another group called “Unkown-Knowns”.  These are facts that we know but suppress and are not considered in this 
discussion as they are a conscious or unconscious deliberate attempt to cover 
analyses are based on openness of data and is invalidated regardless of how one views any other type of 
information.) 
 
Given that different parts of our personality
summary of the perception tendencies for 
risk acceptance decisions.   For each figure, “
known about a risk and “yellow” indicate
colors as there is very little hard and fast 
wheel pieces. 
 
The parts of our Decision Making Personality 
 
The “Big 5” personality traits give rise to thinking behaviors that can be labeled as ways we think about things. 
personality traits can be divided and re
each resultant personality (thinking style) 
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Figure 3. Risk Wheel 
9
. The findings from the research indicate that risk-related decision making 
Johari Window
 is a cognitive psychological tool, created by Joseph Luft and Harry 
ts information we know about ourselves that is also 
 known to others. The 
 (the known unknowns), the Blind (the unknown knowns
personality that affect risk-related decisions
 
total risk model.  Figure 3 gives a simplified view of 
 risk picture as the sum of the triangular wedges 
 be use
-based decision are perceived.   This will be done by coloring the wedges of 
or suppress information
 respond to risks differently, the next section will
different parts of our personalities (aka thinking styles)
Red” indicates unknown facts about a risk, “Green”
s what we know we don’t know.  Graphics are draw
delineation between how personalities view what lies
  
-combined in a myriad of ways to gain perspective.  But once established 
can be evaluated for tendencies toward a particular response given a 
 in its training 
) and Unknown (the 
. Through 
d to illustrate how 
. Engineering 
 present a brief 
 that influence our 
 represents what is 
n in a spectrum of 
 between the wagon 
The 
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particular situation.   It is important to realize that each 
the purposes of understanding influences on decisions but
All people are made-up of a spectrum of the personality parts
moment.  This paper is based on the premise that we are each made up all of the 
results of each part in varying proportions depending 
arrive at a final decision.  This paper will discuss some of the more common personality traits and look at how we 
can use the knowledge of these influences to make better risk
follow differ from the broad all-encompassing “Big 5” personality traits discussed earlier. The authors set of seven 
risk-related traits are the result of observation of decision makers in real world decision
risk-based decisions frequently.  It is not important that the labels themselves are exactly correct or that the observed 
tendencies for a particular label are exactly correct.  This 
construct to help the readers see how risk
and understood, recommendations can be made on how to m
 
1.0 Analytical 
 
The truly analytical 
decision.   This part of our personality is immensely logical and helps us by working to 
build a sound chain of observations and conclusions 
decision.    This part of our personality continuously seeks more information to close any 
potential gaps in our knowledge that might represent an increase in likelihood of realizing 
the undesired consequences of a risk.  It
risk and thus 
3.1 shows that the analytical portion of our personality wants to make a decision when 
nearly all unknowns have become knowns. 
 
2.0 Rule Based 
 
Another part of our personality seeks
standard.  If something or someone else ha
before, it gives us a point of reference from which to judge whether a particular risk is 
acceptable or not.  Risk-based decisions then become criteria based
approach to decision making tends to give a more “black and white” view of the risk.  S
if it meets the criteria, the risk is considered acceptable and if it does not the
not acceptable.  Once satisfied that the risk meets the criteria t
perception of additional (unknown) risk.
considered undecided or unacceptable by this part of our personality.
 
3.0 Negotiator 
 
The negotiator 
on the best 
sources and 
to find the common ground between different views and the
which consensus
new information.  Thus, this part of our personality 
unknown unknowns 
implications o
perceives the risk adequately mitigated.
 
4.0 Emotional 
 
The emotional part of our risk-based decision making 
risk.  Our prior experiences and observations plus 
of influence on how we will respond to the risk.   Football players spend a lot of time and energy “working 
themselves up.” This heightened emotional approach gives them an edge to be more aggressive when taking risks 
Analytical  
Maximize Knowns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Negotiator  
Find Consensus 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
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part of our personality has tendencies tha
 no label will describe a single personality part
 which vary in degree of emphasis from moment to 
personality parts
our own higher level tendencies and how we view the risk to 
-based decisions. The seven proposed 
 making processes who make 
proposed paradigm and the resulting tendencies are a 
-based decision making is influenced.  Once decision making is influence
ake more informed risk-based decisions.
part of our personality wants to study each factor going into a 
that result in a well consider
s nature is to see the unknown as a
finds risk acceptable when it feels it knows all it can about a subject.  
  
 to compare a risk to some already accepted 
s made the same or similar risk-based decision 
 via rules.   This 
o 
n the risk is 
here is generally minimal 
  Conversely until the criteria are met, a risk is 
 
part of our personality seeks expertise and other social sources for advice 
decision.  The negotiator will weigh information and the credibility of the 
will generally seek to find the norm of information.  The negotiator will try 
n build a platform upon 
 can be built.   The negotiator can and will change its 
acknowledge
and attempts to get the consensus of the group to agree on the 
f those unknowns.  Once consensus is achieved the negotiator part of us 
 
derives information from internal cues on how we feel about a 
our state of mind at the time of the risk-based 
Compare to Standard
t can be labeled for 
 accurately.  
 and we utilize the 
traits that will 
d 
 
ed 
 potential large 
Figure 
decision based on 
s the presence of 
decision have a lot 
Rule Based  
 
 
Figure 3.2 
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with the game and their bodies.  This allows the 
field full of much larger men and catch the ball knowing that they will be hit by several 
big opponents.   Very few people would
decider will use the emotion to help them accept the risk and do things they probably 
wouldn’t do in other circumstances.  Those in military or battlefield conflicts also utilize 
this trait to a large extent. This trait generally 
doesn’t know, based mostly on the perceived reward
risk on the same basis. This part of our risk
how we ultimately integrate the other parts of our decision making
do not feel confident about our analytical assessment of a risk we may feel much better 
utilizing our negotiation capabilities and thus give more weight to that assessment. 
 
5.0 Common Sense 
 
As briefly touched on in the prior section
when making a risk
However, each trait
portions of our decision making.  
hybrid of the traits above.  This trait utilizes external information in the form of rules, 
data, and general social responses with their own personal emotional responses to arrive 
at a decision that is practical 
says “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then it’s a duck”.  This trait uses very 
basic information, assesses the information, utilizes social and emotional input to arrive 
at what they believe is the best de
right and wrong and draws strength from these rules.  The major difference between this trait and the rule follower is 
the rule follower will have numerous rules to apply to every situation and the m
will have only a few general rules and will 
 
6.0 Reasoner 
 
The reasoner trait will expend energy in the time available to gain an understanding of 
why one course of action will be better than another.  This part of our personality will 
use all the tools available to find a reasonable answer to a risk mitigatio
include:  rule following, analysis, emotional cues, expert and soc
decision.  This personality trait includes
to go on within the time available.  This trait will also make a very 
time is short.  The true reasoning trait
wrong.  All the previous discussed decision 
measure the rightness or wrongness of the decision.  Thos
believe is THE decision.  The reasoner trait however is often characterized as seeing the 
world in shades of gray as opposed to seeing absolute right to absolute wrong decisions.  The reasoner trait sees 
decisions in terms of the conditions that exist at the time the decision is required and how those decisions will affect 
future goals and objectives.    
 
7.0 Directive 
 
The directive 
to makes decisions relative to the ability to accomplish a goal.  The directive trait will 
dismiss or minimize
directive trait tends to be seen as cold, bossy, or heartless as it often sees emotional 
factors as excess 
also seen a
view of the 
things moving toward a goal.
 
 
Common Sense  
Hybrid 1 
 
Figure 3.5 
Directive  
Hybrid 3 
 
Figure 3.7 
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small wide receiver to run into an open 
 do this on a normal day, but the emotional 
will accept the risk regardless of what it 
.  Conversely, they may reject the 
-based decision making can also influence 
.   For instance, if we 
 
, aspects of our personality also affec
-based decision. The emotional example is the easiest
 can influence the other.  How they interact gives rise to the hybrid 
For instance, the common sense d
and immediately implementable. This is the trait that often 
cision.  This trait usually does have a strong 
ore intuitive “common sense” trait 
use other clues to guide their decisions.    
n concern.  They 
ial input to arrive at a 
 a sense of timing.  This trait will allow analysis 
quick decision when 
 of our personality has little or no fear of being 
traits rely on internal or external cues to 
e traits arrive at what they 
part of our personality is goal-oriented and uses our other
 other factors that do not seem to contribute to that goal.  The 
baggage that hinders efficient decisions.  However, 
s the “get the job done” trait.  Our directive trait tends to take a big picture 
situation and will make assumptions and sometimes generalizations to keep 
  
t each other 
 to understand.  
ecision maker is a 
notion of 
 personality traits 
our directive trait is 
Reasoner  
Hybrid 2 
 
Figure 3.6 
Emotional  
Internal Cues 
 
Figure 3.4 
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It should be noted that each person is made up of a mix of the above traits that is spread across a personality 
spectrum.   These traits are not necessarily independent. These traits work together or sometimes separately to 
influence our risk-based decisions.  It’s important to note again that no person is confined by nature to purely one 
trait. The authors believe that all our traits are influenced by our genetics, our meta-genetics, our volitionary natures 
and the environment. Over time, these influences strengthen some personality traits over others. This strengthening, 
in time, may become more “hard-wired” so that some particular traits subsequently develop into behavioral 
tendencies which if repeated again and again will manifest in the form of character. It is true that our individual way 
of thinking often favors one or two of the traits. In general, we usually associate a person with their dominant 
personality trait (and perhaps their secondary trait) when, in reality, each person is comprised of multiple traits that 
manifest themselves differently over time depending on the internal/external influences.  
B.  Personality Impacts on Risk Based Decisions 
 
Meetings are notorious for being long and boring. The reason is most people are not active participants of any single 
conversation topic and thus, don’t want to “speak out of turn”.  But in a decision making meeting all inputs are 
needed, especially in a risk-based decision meeting.  Each part of our personality has limitations so naturally our 
resultant total personality will have blind spots due, in part, to how we think.  Most often it is difficult for us to see 
our own shortcomings accurately.  David Dunning offers many insights into why we don’t perceive our own 
weaknesses well and through a series of experiments shows that we have a tendency to overestimate our own 
capabilities but are fairly accurate in our assessment of the capabilities of others
11
.  These blind spots and biases play 
a role in risk-based decision making, because it’s our personalities that influence how we “fill in the blanks”.  
 
NASA meetings often end in requests for more information before a decision is made. This is a natural outcome due 
to the makeup of various NASA teams.  Engineers form the vast bulk of the NASA workforce and by and large they 
are analytical in nature.  This is a very good trait to have when designing one of a kind hardware that is used in 
hazardous operations.   Some of the more social personalities at NASA, who learn to balance analytical traits with 
other traits, find themselves in leadership positions.  They are often good negotiators who find “sensible” solutions 
when confronted with many options.  However, many development meetings do end in “indecisions” with 
subsequent requests for more information.   Based on the above, the dynamics of these situations are easy to 
understand.   A large group of analytical thinkers come together with a few negotiators to make a decision.  The 
analytical types are reluctant to commit to a decision without further information.  The negotiators are trying to find 
common ground and often resort to issuing action items for more data so that the team can focus its efforts and move 
forward.   However, when the group is reassembled it is often the case that new requests for information are made 
and more time and cost are expended on the questions.  This process is often repeated many times. For times when 
the question is not safety-critical, there’s often a missing personality to help the team move forward even in the 
midst of uncertain or missing information. This missing personality type is the directive person. The directive person 
would likely have a tendency to make sure a question is explored but when it becomes repetitive will often make a 
decision themselves and move the team onto new problems.  The addition of another personality type can often 
change the tone of the room and the level of engagement of the personnel. Similarly, the reasoner type can also 
contribute as they will try to assimilate the new information and make a time based judgment on what should be 
done at that point in time.   
 
Thus, changing the makeup of the participants in the meeting can greatly influence the thoroughness of the 
assessment and the time it takes to make a proper risk-based decision.  For example:  consider a room full of people 
of primarily directive type traits.   Each is self directive, self reliant and confident in their choices for a best solution 
to a given problem.  Each will utilize their other personality trait in varying degrees as observations to “fill in the 
gaps” for what they don’t know and in the absence of further direction or information when faced with a deadline 
will make a decision and help his or her team move forward.  Except, unless a very unusual situation arises, they 
will each have different backgrounds and biases and each different perspectives and so are likely to reach different 
conclusions about a risk.  They will each defend those conclusions ardently.  With no negotiator to help the decision 
making process this aggressive group is unlikely to reach a consensus. It’s the combination of analytical, reasoner, 
emotional, and directive traits that result in a productive meeting. 
 
NASA is very good at encouraging diversity but the diversity used in technical meetings is mostly “did we talk to 
the right people?” or “Did we get someone from every engineering discipline to look at this risk and give us an 
input?”  In other words, NASA sometimes utilizes functional diversity and thus asks for inputs from more analytical 
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Figure 4:  NASA Risk Informed Decision Process
12
 
 
types. The consequence remains that NASA seldom get inputs by deliberately considering diverse personality types.       
However, it’s not reasonable to expect NASA or any developer to build a workforce of completely diverse 
personalities.  This is because they must hire engineers into engineering positions and engineers coming out of 
school or industry are highly analytical by nature.   In addition, NASA managers have to find a candidate that will fit 
the job description.  Then there are the legal aspects like the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 
2008 that makes job consideration based on traits that come to us via genetics illegal.   Our total personality can be 
attributed to our genetic makeup and so making board or panel selections based on personality criteria could be a 
precarious proposition at best for a NASA manager.   
C.   Risk Informed Design 
 
Like many industries, NASA adheres to internal policies and practices regarding risk assessment.  This includes 
tools and frequent reviews to stay aware of programmatic risks.   However, risk-based decisions are often very slow 
in coming as is evidenced by the lengthy durations many risk items remain open.   Even after making risk-based 
decisions, the ultimate outcome of the risk can be very different than the risk initially forecasted.  This is often due 
to an inherent inability to assess the true likelihood of an undesired event.  
 
The Constellation program tried to deal with risk using a new paradigm.  The program decided that instead of 
establishing an essentially rule based risk mitigation process where the severity of the risk alone dictated how much 
design redundancy was required, the total level of the risk itself would be used to drive the robustness of the design.   
The concept was called Risk Informed Design Making process
12
 (see Figure 4). The premise of this process allows 
each risk to be judged on its own merits and mitigations are developed based on those merits.  NASA’s use of 
consultation and deliberation are keys in this processes. However, a challenge arose within Constellation due to this 
approach. In short, while highly successful as a concept, implementation was difficult.  Risk is a quantity defined to 
be the result a combination of likelihood and consequence.  But in new one-of-a-kind designs there’s no real 
demonstrated history to quantify likelihood.  So the program may choose a “one failure tolerant” solution to a risk 
because they believe that it is not high, but there is no concrete data to support that assessment until after the 
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verification program begins.  And the verification program cannot begin until a design is selected and hardware built 
to test.  The verification can show that the original judgments were very wrong or very right, but in the early stages 
of design and development there simply is no way to know.   
 
This introduces a new problem.  When there are essentially two or three personality types available in a NASA 
environment, the community can become polarized around particular risks.  The analytical types will view the 
unknowns as a significant threat and the directive or emotional folks will sometimes view the unknowns as trivial.   
There is no data to support either view and so risk items get identified but cannot close, hazard causes get opened 
but no one can agree on what is sufficient mitigation for them and the community becomes unable to proceed 
efficiently through design discussions. Engineering decisions become much more reliant on management judgment 
calls and not on development testing that characterized engineering decades ago. Risk Informed Decision Making is 
actually a sound and practical design approach but it has limitation when it comes to unique one-of-a-kind hardware 
operating in unique environments. 
 
D.  Risk Quantification 
 
Entire industries have been built up based on risk quantification. Modeling techniques involving very sophisticated 
combinations of parameters and risk evaluation approaches have been built to gain a better understanding of risk for 
a particular industry or function. Increasing knowledge about a risk does increase reliability of a risk prediction 
being correct, but the reliability of that assessment decreases rapidly as the amount of uncertainty increases.  Blind 
adherence to a model can lead to erroneous conclusions and so the limitations of a model must be understood.  In 
other words, if you don’t know what you don’t know then how can you know the model limitations are not affecting 
the outcome?   Our perceptions about the model and what we don’t know we don’t know can lead us to different 
conclusions based on our backgrounds and experiences.   
 
This is not to say risk likelihood modeling has no value.  On the contrary, especially if used to predict the outcome 
of two very similar designs it can be very successful at determining which design is more reliable.  This is because 
when comparing two very similar designs used in the same way in the same environment you have dramatically 
limited the cases that add variation.   Because you have a high correlation between the two designs you also have a 
high correlation of unknown unknowns that could influence the outcomes and so significantly reduce the number of 
unknown unknowns that could impact the outcome of the comparison. Thus, the reliability of the predictions 
increases dramatically. You may not understand the total reliability of either system but you can much more 
confidently see the difference in reliability between the systems.   
 
Risk quantification is so inherently difficult to get right that a major disaster like the Columbia accident could not be 
accurately forecasted.  Debris generation and transport models already existed, the hazard analysis already identified 
that debris impact on the Orbiter thermal protection system could be a catastrophic hazard, but the likelihood of a 
catastrophic hazard due to foam strike was considered as “infrequent” which was the third highest of the four 
likelihood categories for Shuttle hazard reports. Today, it is considered the most likely cause to a potentially 
catastrophic event because we have more data.   Whether either answer was right or wrong is not important to this 
paper, what’s important is that no matter how you mathematically characterize a risk it’s still our perception of the 
residual risk and our perceptions of the applicability of the model and its uncertainties that give rise to our decisions.  
 
E.  Recommendations for Addressing Risk 
 
NASA has been in the risk business for decades and has reaped the benefits and suffered the consequences of risk-
based decision making. Since perception of the risk associated with what we don’t know we don’t know influences 
our risk-based decisions, we now need to establish how this knowledge can be used to the benefit of a program.   
There are two ways this knowledge can be used:  1) diversify the set of personality traits involved in making the 
risk-based decision and 2) strategic safety margin management.  
 
1.  Diversify the Set of Personality Traits 
 
Since risk assessment comes down to estimating likelihood and data needed to make an effective likelihood 
assessment, it follows that good risk-based decision making relies on getting the fullest picture you can of the 
likelihood of the risk. Also, since the risk is really our perception of the risk, and different personalities will see the 
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same risk differently, it becomes important to get multiple personality type perspectives.  This is very similar to how 
NASA creates boards with multiple discipline perspectives for making decisions (functional diversity).   The Rogers 
Commission Report on Challenger recommended that astronauts be included in the safety decision process. Our 
concept would take this one step further and the major risk-based decision boards and panels could be evaluated for 
their personality mixes. This proposed personality mixing should achieve a balance so that the manager can utilize 
multiple perspectives to reach a better decision.  This is more subtle than just saying safety should be there and 
speak, and design should be there, and operations, etc.  It’s saying that the board or panel needs to include as many 
diverse decision making types as is reasonable to get a more comprehensive risk picture. 
 
Analyzing this proposal, one must determine what is practical. Per the GINA act of 2008, using personality 
considerations to select board members could be considered illegal.  Furthermore, it is not practical to expect to 
derive a board of decision makers that represent every personality trait AND every necessary technical basis for a 
decision.  However, it is important to mitigate the natural “blind spots” we have in our individual ways of thinking.  
To resolve these competing goals the manager could at least become aware of what personality traits their thinking 
most resembles and consciously take steps to assure their blind spots are addressed.  For example, if a team/board or 
decision maker is made up primarily of directive tendencies then making sure extra time is taken to ensure some 
negotiation between the different supporting analytical groups has occurred and finding out what conditions or 
reservations those groups had regarding the decision could be enlightening.  This is very consistent with the CAIB 
board findings.  This is not easily done by a group who wants to make a decision and move on but the benefit could 
be avoidance of a downstream problem.  Simple steps like requiring assumptions to be shown with any analysis 
results summary, or stating boundary conditions for any analysis, and bringing forward minor concerns would go a 
long way to towards keeping eyes open to potential blind spots and thus potential unknown-unknowns. The majority 
of engineering time and effort goes into demonstrating how well we know what we know.  This is not wasted effort 
but characterizing the boundaries of what you don’t know about a risk will give a lot of additional value.  Analysis 
efforts and tools need to be matured to better capture this aspect of risk. 
 
2. Strategic Margin Management 
 
A second process enhancement mitigates the challenges of early risk-informed design process limitations as well as 
addresses holes created by the structure of the analysis. The development of new, one-of-a-kind hardware takes 
away some of the benefits of Risk Informed Design and adds cost in the early stages of a program due to 
irresolvable debates about what level of risk the design actually presents.   In addition, it puts the program at a great 
degree of “risk” for late redesigns to major systems when risk assumptions are invalidated by actual test and 
analyses.  Since validated likelihood data is not available (and will not be for years) during the early program stages, 
an alternate way to approach program safety risk is to start with an adaptive rule based approach.  Blind adherence 
to a standard is not effective in engineering a robust but high performance space vehicle, but, relying solely on 
model data that has not been validated is not wise either.   This is because there is considerable risk that some 
assumptions will be proven wrong much later in the program life cycle and design changes will be required.  
Instead, by acknowledging that unknown unknowns exist, a program can take a different approach to managing 
those same risks.   As an example, in the initial design stages all functional hazards deemed catastrophic could be 
designed to be “two-failure tolerant” without exception.  Then, as the design details mature and likelihood of the risk 
gets some validation, the necessary levels of failure tolerance or other mitigations may be removed where warranted.  
Uncertainty is removed through knowledge and testing, demonstrations and analyses can impart additional 
knowledge that is sufficient to show that hazard controls can be effective.  Once validations are completed there is 
hard evidence to justify lowering levels of failure tolerance, because the expected performance of the controlling 
equipment has been shown with some degree of confidence.   Effects of this approach are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5 shows the relationships when risk is managed by Risk Informed Design.  Because large-scale integration 
programs are one-of-a-kind unique endeavors, there doesn’t exist a pool of real flight vehicles from which to assess 
the risks associate with a new vehicle design concept. Reliability and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) engineers 
rely on two processes to help them estimate the actual undesired event likelihood. They either use data from prior 
programs to simulate today’s performance or conduct Bayesian type analyses to use performance data from other 
industries to get a likelihood of the particular concern.   Using Apollo, Shuttle and Space Station data where 
appropriate is the best NASA can achieve, but the number of flights across all these programs together is relatively 
small. Thus, the set of unknown unknowns may not be well characterized. As shown in Figure 5, as the verification 
program begins, the amount of uncertainty decreases and the models become more refined and are later used to  
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modeled ru decreases
 
Figure 5:  Risk Profile - Risk Informed Design Decision Making. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Potential Risk Posture when unknown-unknowns are taken into account. 
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validate the actual total risk margin on the program.   However, since the amount of unknown unknowns is not 
understood and there is much complexity in large scale integration, it becomes apparent that this path has a 
significant vulnerability to unexpected changes later in the program.  This is especially true for cases where the final 
verification finds that an assumption about the design was not valid.  
 
Figure 5 also illustrates one of the goals of the analytical tools is to show that the program meets some minimum 
level of acceptable risk for the integrated design.   Since it’s trying to measure relative to the minimum it has the 
unintended consequence of pushing the design toward to the point where it mitigates the minimum known of 
hazards/ risks of a design.  This approach literally pushes the design away from higher margins throughout the 
program life cycle.   The approach creates a hidden assumption that the design is always near compliance with the 
minimum acceptable level or risk.   It does not acknowledge that there is risk in the realm beyond its boundary plus 
its margin, and thus constrains what the program will consider for hazard controls.   However in the early stages of 
the program this hidden assumption cannot be validated. 
   
Figure 6 shows an alternative approach that provides more robustness against later program changes.  This is done 
by assuming the set of unknown unknowns to be much larger than the prior example. In this case the designers start 
with the assumption that large margin is needed to cover all cases.  If nearly simultaneously the designers also begin 
testing and test based analysis that validates how the design of a system/subsystem will perform. If that performance 
is shown to be above the minimum level of acceptable risk line, the design for that system or subsystem can safely 
be reduced to one failure tolerance. And if additional test based verification shows that the one failure tolerant 
design is still well above the minimum acceptable risk line, the design concept can safely be reduced to zero failure 
tolerance.  Managing Risk Informed Design via incremental risk reduction this way helps to mitigate the potential 
costs of modeling a system and then later finding out an assumption was erroneous and having to do a redesign.  
This is also known as “build a little test a little” risk reduction.  The impact of program/project retrofit on program 
costs is available in the Seminar Series course “Extreme Software Cost Estimating
13
”.  Course results shows that the 
effect of retrofit is so significant that even when work is spread out longer with lower staffing, the total cost due to 
rework is unacceptably high and the accompanying schedule delays are significant. Furthermore the authors show 
that our ability to estimate true program costs is historically (for Government programs) off by factors of two to four 
times the original estimates due to rework costs. Said simply, using an approach where risk buy-down must be 
validated before a design can have margins reduced (Figure 6) will save programs large amounts of rework costs 
that will inevitably be realized when the formal test program gets underway.  This strategy appears to represent an 
advantage for reducing overall costs because it tackles unique, one-of-a-kind, large scale development risks with a 
strategy that formally acknowledges the existence of unknown unknowns.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
NASA has a long history with respect to risk-based decisions and has experienced the consequences of risk-based 
decision errors and enjoyed the success of correct risk-based decisions.  No risk process is foolproof but these 
suggested modifications to NASA’s already robust risk-based decision processes should effectively increase the 
knowledge and experience base for future risk-based decisions and as those grow so can the quality of the risk-based 
decisions. Today’s space exploration programs are moving toward more “risk based design” approaches.  Thus, risk 
identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering development process.  This 
paper explores the factors of known risk mitigations/verifications and unknown risks and ascertains how various 
personalities of risk-based decision makers are affected by what they know and what they don’t know. Giving 
consideration for mitigating some of the unknown unknowns can have very positive benefits by 1) exposing blind 
spots in our thinking that can lead to erroneous conclusions and by 2) including them in the margin assessments that 
give rise to high performing designs.  
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